

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03 L-02 IO-03

AF-04 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00

EUR-10 AID-10 ACDA-10 SPC-01 DRC-01 /087 W

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R 031109Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5433

INFO USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT CAIRO UNN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13681

LIMDIS/NOFORN

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF

SUBJECT: LEBANESE IMPRESSIONS OF ALGIERS SUMMIT

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO DIRGEN OF PRESIDENCY (DIB) AND OTHER LEBANESE OBSERVERS, ALGIERS SUMMIT WENT AS WELL AS COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BOTH IN REASONABLENESS OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE AND IN BEHIND-THE-SCENES AGREEMENT TO LEAVE EGYPT AND SYRIA WITH FREE HAND TO PURSUE NEGOTIATING TRACK AND ATTEND GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE. CHIEFS OF STATE OBLIGED SET ASIDE SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY FONMINS SINCE LATTER TENDED ENGAGE IN MORE TRADITIONAL ARAB HARD LINE POSTURING BOTH IN SPEECHES AND PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS FOR CHIEFS OF STATE. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDA. END SUMMARY.

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1. ON SUBJECT PLO AND JORDAN, DIB SADI THAT BOUMEDIENNE EXTREMELY

TOUGH IN REJECTING ANY ROLE FOR GOJ AND KING HUSSEIN, AND THAT BOUMEDIENNE'S PRIVATE REMARKS ABOUT SAME AS HIS INTERVIEW WITH EGYPTIAN PAPERS AL GHAMHURIYAH AND ROSE EL YUSIF, LEBANESE PAPER AN NAHAR AND ALGERIAN PAPER AL MOUJAHID. PRESIDENT FRANGIE MADE POINT IN PRIVATE TO BOUDEMIENNE THAT JURISDICALLY ISRAEL HAD TAKEN WEST BANK FROM GOJ AND THEREFORE GOJ WAS PROPER AUTHORITY TO WHICH IT SHOULD BE RETURNED. BOUMEDIENNE REJECTED THAT IDEA AND TOLD FRANGIE THAT IF PLO SHOULD BE GIVEN CONTROL OF EAST BANK AS WELL IT WOULD FACILITATE DEPARTURE OF ALL PALESTINIANS LIVING IN LEBANON; OTHERWISE PALESTINIAN STATE COULD NOT SUPPORT THEM. FRANGIE DEMURRED, SAYING THIS NOT RPT NOT WHAT GOL HAS IN MIND. OTHER OBSERVERS ALSO STRUCK TOUGH, EMOTIONAL ALGERIAN ATTITUDE RE PLO, COMPARING IT TO ATTITUDE GOA HAD HELD IN PAST TOWARD VIET CONG AND CUBA.

2. DIB SAID THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAD BEEN OBLIGED RAISE WITH PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASSAD SYRIAN-INITIATED PROPOSAL WHICH HAD BEEN PASSED BY FONMINS CALLING FOR LEBANON TO BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF "STRATEGIC DEPTH" OF ARAB FRONT IN EVENT HOSTILITIES RESUMED, AND PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW UNIFIED ARAB HIGH MILITARY COMMAND. NET EFFECT OF THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN, IN LEBANESE VIEW, TO PLUNGE LEBANON ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY INTO WAR SHOULD THERE BE ANOTHER ROUND OF HOSTILITIES. IT WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIGH COMMAND THEORETICAL POWER TO ORDER IRAQI TROOPS INTO JORDAN, SYRIAN TROOPS INTO LEBANON, ETC. ASSAD AND SADAT WERE MOST COOPERATIVE AND AGREED TO DROP IDEAS OF "STRATEGIC DEPTH" AND UNIFIED HIGH COMMAND. IDEA OF UNIFIED ARAB FUND FOR COMPENSATION FOR WAR

DAMAGES (PRIMARILY FOR SYRIA) ALSO STOPPED. GOL THUS RETAINS FORMER POSITION AS "SUPPORT" STATE AND ABLE CONTINUE REPLY LEGALLY UPON 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

3. DIB SAYS THAT PARTICIPATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARAB GOVTS IN ANOTHER ROUND OF HOSTILITIES, AND IN COMPENSATING SYRIA AND OTHERS FOR WAR LOSSES LEFT TO CHOICE OF GOVTS INVOLVED. GOL HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY ITS INTENTION TO PRESENT TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY A BILL ALLOCATING FIVE PER CENT OF ANNUAL BUDGET TO "JOINT ARAB EFFORT", PRESUMABLY INCLUDING ACCELERATED ARAB INFORMATION EFFORTS, AS WELL AS COMPENSATION FOR WAR DAMAGES ETC. IT HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED INTENTION CONTRIBUTE FIVE MILLION DOLLARS TO NEW ARAB DEVELOPMENT

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FUND FOR AFRICA.

4. ON JERUSALEM AND ON OIL BOYCOTT, DIB SAID LEBANESE FOUND SAUDI DELEGATION VERY RIGID. LEBANESE POINTED OUT DANGERS OF ANTAGONIZING WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA BUT GOT NOWHERE. LEBANESE HAVE TENTATIVELY CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR VATICAN NOT RPT NOT TO TAKE SPECIFIC POSITION ON QUESTION JERUSALEM AT THIS TIME, BUT RATHER TO WAIT UNTIL LATER

STAGE WHEN SOME OF OTHER PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. AT THAT TIME, CHRISTIAN SUGGESTIONS MIGHT FORM BASIS FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN WHAT LEBANESE SEE AS LIKELY DEADLOCK BETWEEN ISRAELI (JEWISH) AND SAUDI (ISLAMIC) POSITIONS. THEY HAVE CONVEYED THEIR IMPRESSIONS TO VATICAN.

5. CONCERNING SYRIAN POSITION, DIB AND OTHER LEBANESE OBSERVERS REMARKED TOUGH ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY FONMIN KHADDAM BUT SAID THAT KHADDAM ALMOST ALWAYS TAKES TRADITIONAL BAATH HARD LINE IN PUBLIC. PRESIDENT ASSAD MUCH LESS STRIDENT AND ADHERED FAITHFULLY TO PARAMETERS OF RES 242 IN CALLING FIVE TIMES IN HIS LAST SPEECH FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM "OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES" INSTEAD OF "ARAB TERRITORIES". ORMER FORMULATIN INTERPRETED IN ARAB CIRCLES TO MEAN ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL WHILE ORMER MEANS SC RES 242.  
BUFFUM

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PFOR, XF, LE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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